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Abstract. A lack of awareness regarding online security behaviour can leave users and their 
devices vulnerable to compromise.  This paper highlights potential areas where users may fall 
victim to online attacks, and reviews existing tools developed to raise users’ awareness of secu-
rity behaviour.  An ongoing research project is described, which provides a combined monitor-
ing solution and affective feedback system, designed to provide affective feedback on automat-
ic detection of risky security behaviour within a web browser.  Results gained from the research 
conclude an affective feedback mechanism in a browser-based environment, can promote gen-
eral awareness of online security. 
 
 
Keywords: End-user security behaviours, usable security, affective feedback, user, monitoring 




Risky behaviour exhibited by the end-user may place devices at risk, despite the 
widespread availability of security tools [1].  This has become a growing concern 
owing to the reliance on the internet for online banking, e-commerce transactions, 
consumption of media, and the maintenance of social ties. This paper describes an 
approach whereby the concept of affective feedback is applied to the domain of a 
browser-based environment via the use of an extension.  The extension has been de-
veloped in an attempt to educate users regarding online security, with the end-goal of 
raising security awareness. 
2 Background 
Security measures on devices are often seen as restrictive and obtrusive by end-users, 
potentially limiting users’ ability to perform tasks.  To circumvent these measures, 
users may engage in behaviours which are deemed to be risky, placing their devices at 
risk of compromise. 
This section explores previous research, highlighting risky security behaviours 
users may inadvertently engage in, and perception of risk.  Previous attempts at 
educating the end-user are discussed, before proposing the concept of affective 
feedback as a possible method to educate the end-user. 
 
2.1 Risky security behaviour 
What constitutes risky behaviour is not necessarily obvious to all end-users and can 
be difficult to recognise.  In the context of a browser-based environment there are 
multiple examples of behaviour which could be perceived as risky, e.g., creating weak 
passwords/sharing passwords with colleagues [2][3], downloading data from unsafe 
websites [4] or interacting with a website containing coding vulnerabilities [5].  
Attempts have been made to categorise behaviours displayed by users which could 
be classified as risky, including a 2005 paper by Stanton et al. [2]. Following 
interviews with both security experts and IT experts, and a study involving end-users 
in the US, across a range of professions, a taxonomy of 6 behaviours was defined: 
intentional destruction, detrimental misuse, dangerous tinkering, naïve mistakes, 
aware assurance and basic hygiene. 
Padayachee [6] discussed compliant security behaviours whilst investigating if 
some users had a predisposition to adhering to security behaviour. A taxonomy 
developed highlighted elements which have the potential to influence security 
behaviours in users i.e. extrinsic motivation, identification, awareness and 
organisational commitment. The paper acknowledges the taxonomy does not present a 
complete overview of all possible motivational factors regarding compliance with 
security policies. Despite this, it may provide a basis as to how companies could start 
to improve security education of employees. 
Weak passwords are associated with poor security behaviour and a trade-off exists 
between the usability of passwords and the level of security they provide [3].  Whilst 
exploring the issue of security hygiene, Stanton et al. [2] touched on the subject of 
passwords noting that 27.9% of participants wrote their passwords down and 23% 
revealed their passwords to colleagues Others have explored the usability of 
passwords and have acknowledged the difficulties end-users can experience in 
choosing a password whereby it was determined “length requirements alone are not 
sufficient for usable and secure passwords” [7]. 
Another risky behaviour category relates to how users perceive technology flaws, 
e.g. vulnerability to XSS attacks or session hijacking. Social engineering can also be 
considered to fall into this category: e.g. an attacker could potentially clone a profile 
on a social networking site and utilise the information to engineer an attack against a 
target (e.g. via a malicious link) [5]. Such attacks can be facilitated by revealing too 
much personal information on social networking sites [8]. 
A paper by Milne et. al. [9] also investigated risky behaviours and compared this 
with self-efficacy. The paper concludes that depending on the demographic and the 
self-efficacy of the end-user, different types of behaviour are exhibited online. 449 
people participated in the web-based study. During the survey, participants were asked 
if they had engaged in specific risky behaviours online.  These suggestions were 
drawn from previous research into risky behaviours [10-11]. 
Specific behaviours users were asked about in the survey included the use of 
private email addresses to register for contests on websites, selecting passwords 
consisting of dictionary words, and accepting unknown friends on social networking 
sites. The most common risky behaviour which participants admitted to was allowing 
the computer to save passwords: 56% of participants admitted to this. 
Whilst there has been a number of attempts to categorise risky security behaviours, 
users may also exhibit a lack of perception regarding risk. 
 
2.2 Perception of risk 
A number of research papers have explored techniques to gauge the perception of 
risk. Farahmand et al. [12] explored the possibility of using a psychometric model 
originally developed by Fischoff et al. in 1978 [13] in conjunction with question-
naires, allowing a user to reflect on their actions and gauge their perception, providing 
a qualitative overview.   
Takemura [14] also used questionnaires when investigating factors determining the 
likelihood of workers complying with information security policies defined within a 
company, in an attempt to measure perception of risk. Participants were asked a hypo-
thetical question regarding whether or not they would implement an anti-virus solu-
tion on their computer if there was a risk of being infected by a virus. Results revealed 
that 52.7% of users would implement an antivirus solution if the risk was only 1% 
however, 3% of respondents still refused to implement antivirus, even when the risk 
was at 99%.  This displays a wide range of attitudes towards risk perception. 
San-José and Rodriguez [15] used a multimodal approach to measure perception of 
risk.  In a study of over 3000 households with PCs connected to the internet, users 
were given an antivirus program to install which scanned the machines on a monthly 
basis. The software was supplemented by quarterly questionnaires, allowing levels of 
perception to be measured and compared with virus scan results. Users were success-
fully monitored and results showed that the antivirus software created a false sense of 
security and they were unaware of how serious certain risks could be. 
In a different study, Hill and Donaldson [16] proposed a methodology to integrate 
models of behaviour and perception.  The research attempted to assess the perception 
of security the system administrator possessed.  It also created a trust model, reducing 
the threat from malicious software. The methodology engaged system administrators 
whilst developing the threat modelling process, and quantified risk of threats, essen-
tially creating a triage system to deal with issues. 
Understanding the level of risk perception a user possesses can help identify the 
best methods to educate users regarding security behaviour. 
2.3 Tools to educate end-users  
Since there is the potential for end-users to inadvertently engage in behaviours 
deemed risky, many tools have been developed to help users. 
Furnell et. al. [17] conducted a study in 2006, to gain an insight into how end-users 
deal with passwords. The survey found that 22% of participants said they lacked secu-
rity awareness, with 13% of people admitting they required security training. Partici-
pants also found browser security dialogs confusing and in some cases, misunder-
stood the warnings they were provided with. The majority of participants considered 
themselves as above average in terms of their understanding of technology, yet many 
struggled with basic security. 
Much of the research conducted into keeping users safe online, educating them 
about risky security behaviour revolves around phishing attacks. Various solutions 
have been developed to gauge how to educate users about the dangers of phishing 
attacks, with the view that education will reduce engagement in risky security behav-
iours. 
Dhamija and Tygar [18] proposed a method to enable users to distinguish between 
spoofed websites and genuine sites. A Firefox extension was developed providing 
users with a trusted window in which to enter login details. A remote server generated 
a unique image used to customise the web page the user is visiting, whilst the browser 
detects the image and displays it in the trusted window e.g. as a background image on 
the page. Content from the server is authenticated via the use of the secure Remote 
Password Protocol. If the images match, the website is genuine and provides a simple 
way for a user to verify the authenticity of the website. 
Sheng et. al [19] tried a different approach to reducing risky behaviour, gamifying 
the subject of phishing with a tool named Anti-Phishing Phil. The game involves a 
fish named Phil who has to catch worms, avoiding the worms, on the end of fisher- 
men’s hooks (these are the phishing attempts). The study compared 3 approaches to 
teaching users about phishing: playing the Anti-Phishing Phil game, reading a tutorial 
developed or reading existing online information. After playing the game, 41% of 
participants viewed the URL of the web page, checking if it was genuine. The game 
produced some unwanted results in that participants became overly cautious, produc-
ing a number of false-positives during the experimental phase. 
PhishGuru is another training tool designed by Kumaraguru et. al [20] to discour-
age people from revealing information in phishing attacks. When a user clicks on a 
link in a suspicious email, they are presented with a cartoon message, warning them 
of the dangers of phishing, and how they can avoid becoming a victim. The cartoon 
proved to be effective: participants retained the information after 28 days didn't cause 
participants to become overly cautious.  
Similarly, an Android app called NoPhish has been developed to educate users 
about phishing on mobile devices [21].  The game features multiple levels where 
users are presented with a URL and are asked if is a legitimate link or a phishing at-
tempt.  In a study conducted after playing the game, participants gave significantly 
more correct answers when asked about phishing.  A further long-term study was 
conducted 5 months later.  The long-term outcomes showed participants still per-
formed well however, their overall performance decreased. 
Besmer et. al [22] acknowledged that various applications may place users at risk 
by revealing personal information. A tool was developed and tested on Facebook to 
present a simpler way of informing the user about who could view their information. 
A prototype user interface highlighted the information the site required, optional in- 
formation, the profile data the user had provided and the percentage of the users’ 
friends who could see the information entered. The study showed that those who were 
already interested in protecting their information found the interface useful in viewing 
how applications handled the data. 
In addition to security tools which have been developed to target privacy issues on 
social networking sites, studies have also focused on more general warning tools for 
the web. A Firefox extension developed by Maurer [23] attempts to provide alert 
dialogs when users are entering sensitive data such as credit card information. The 
extension seeks to raise security awareness, providing large JavaScript dialogs to 
warn users, noting that the use of certain colours made the user feel more secure. 
More recently, Volkamer et. al. [24] developed a Firefox Add-On, called PassSec 
in attempt to help users detect websites which provided insecure environments for 
entering a password.  The extension successfully raised security awareness and signif-
icantly reduced the number of insecure logins. 
Despite the number of tools created to help protect users online, users continue to 
engage in risky security behaviour. The tools developed span a number of years, indi-
cating users still require security education.  Therefore, this suggests that a different 
approach is needed when conveying information to end-users.  Ongoing research is 
described and explores the use of affective feedback as a suitable method of educating 
the end-user, raising security awareness. 
2.4 Affective feedback 
In terms of computing, this is defined as “computing that relates to, arises from, or 
deliberately influences emotions” [25].  Types of affective feedback include, specific 
text or phrases, and avatars with subtle facial cues.  Such feedback has previously 
been beneficial in educational environments [26-28]. 
Several methods can be employed to inform the user that they are exhibiting risky 
behaviour. Ur et al. [29] investigated ways in which feedback could be given to users, 
in the context of aiding a user in choosing a more secure password. Research 
conducted found that users could be influenced to increase their password security if 
terms such as “weak” were used to describe their current attempt. In the research, 
colour was also used as a factor to provide feedback to users. When test subjects were 
entering passwords into the system, a bar meter was shown next to the input field. 
Depending upon the complexity of the password, the meter displayed a scale ranging 
from green/blue for a good/strong password, to red, for a simplistic, easy to crack 
password. Affective properties of colour were highlighted by Osgood and Adams in 
1973 [30], and colours such as red signify danger in Western culture.  Data gathered 
from the experiments showed that the meters also had an effect on users, prompting 
them to increase system security by implementing stronger passwords. 
Multimedia content such as the use of colour and sound can also be used to provide 
feedback to the user. In a game named “Brainchild” developed by McDarby et al. 
[26], users must gain control over their bio-signals by relaxing. In an attempt to help 
users relax, an affective feedback mechanism has been implemented whereby the 
sounds, colours and dialogues used provides a calming mechanism. 
Textual information provided via the GUI can be used to communicate feedback to 
the user.  Dehn and Van Mulken [31] conducted an empirical review of ways in which 
animated agents could interact with users. They provided a comparison between the 
role of avatars and textual information in human-computer interaction. It was 
hypothesised that textual information provided more direct feedback to users 
however, avatars could be used to provide more subtle pieces of information via 
gestures or eye contact. Ultimately it was noted multimodal interaction could provide 
users with a greater level of communication with the computer system. 
Previous research has indicated that affective feedback could be utilised when 
aiding users in considering their security behaviour online, since it can detect and help 
users alter their internal states [26]. Work conducted by Robison et al. [27] used 
avatars in an intelligent tutoring system to provide support to users, noting that such 
agents have to decide whether to intervene when a user is working, to provide 
affective feedback.  
Hall et al. [28] concurs with the notion of using avatars to provide affective 
feedback to users, indicating that they influence the emotional state of the end-user. 
Avatars were deployed in a personal social and health education environment, to 
educate children about the subject of bullying. Studies showed that the avatars 
produced an empathetic effect in children, indicating that the same type of feedback 
could potentially be used to achieve the same result in adults. 
2.5 The relationship between security behavior, education, and affective 
feedback 
Although there's a number of security tools available which have been designed to 
help the end-user, people are still falling victim to online attacks.  This suggests that 
perhaps a different approach is required.  The ongoing research discussed in the fol-
lowing sections offers the application of affective feedback in the context of a brows-
er-based environment, in attempt to raise the security awareness of end-users. 
3 Methodology 
The work developed as part of the research project proposes the use of a browser 
extension to automatically detect risky security behaviour. Previous research has indi-
cated affective feedback has the potential to serve as a suitable method to educate 
users regarding risky security behaviours [26-28]. Within the scope of the browser 
environment, on detection of risky security behaviour, the browser is used as a deliv-
ery mechanism for affective feedback, warning users about their actions. 
3.1 Testing harness overview 
The research project proposed the creation of a testing harness, in the form of a XUL 
(XML User Interface Language) browser extension for Mozilla Firefox, including the 
ability to monitor user behaviour and provide suitable affective feedback (Fig. 1). The 
extension developed was named Spengler-Zuul, and utilises several feedback agents. 
Should the monitoring system detect a user engaging in a known, potentially risky 
security behaviour whilst browsing the internet e.g. entering a commonly used pass-
word into a website, an affective feedback mechanism triggers, warning users regard-




Fig. 1. Overview of the Spengler-Zuul extension 
3.2 Monitoring solution 
To detect potentially risky security behaviours, and trigger affective feedback at op-
portune moments, a monitoring system had to be created within the confines of a 
browser- based environment. 
Research conducted by Bubaš, Orehova and & Konecki [32] and, Milne, Labrecque 
and Cromer [9] define specific risky security behaviours. A smaller subset of these 
behaviours were chosen for implementation, owing to their suitability for monitoring 
in the context of a web browser. Checks for these behaviours were built into a moni-
toring solution: 
• Commonly used words in a password 
• Password contains personal information 
• Password length 
• Malicious links found on page 
• Current page is a malicious link 
• Site is served via HTTP 
• Current page is a top 20 social media site 
When the user interacts with the browser, the information is encrypted, and pro-
cessed on the server.  As an example, processing the information on a server allows 
the URL of a current site to be compared against a known database of malicious sites 
[33].  Detection of a malicious site can then trigger the affective feedback mechanism, 
delivering some form of information to the end-user. 
The development of a monitoring solution required a method of logging user ac-
tions. Previous research conducted by Fenstermacher and Ginsburg [34] noted the use 
of an XML log file generated by users’ actions within a particular application. Draw-
ing inspiration from this approach, a logging system was developed for the monitor-
ing solution whereby a unique log is generated on a server for each user, and their 
actions are recorded.  In terms of future work, this can be used to build-up a local 
profile of the end-user, determining common mistakes they may engage in. 
3.3 Affective feedback delivery 
Following the implementation of the monitoring system, an affective feedback 
delivery system was put in place.  Risky behaviours triggered a form of affective 
feedback within the browser, using weighted sentences constructed from an affective 
word list [35], colour, and avatars to alert users to possible risks. 
Previous research has indicated there are a number of types of affective feedback 
which could be utilised within the web browser window, to help guide users into 
making more appropriate security decisions.  Depending on the actions of the user, 
they may be offered positive reinforcement because of their behaviour, negative 
reinforcement, or a mixture of both positive and negative. The 3 affective methods 
chosen were colours, avatars and text. The following section will discuss each type of 
feedback in more detail. 
 
Text-based feedback 
Research highlighted text-based feedback as an appropriate form of affective 
feedback for disseminating information to the end-user. When Ur et al. [29] 
investigated password strength meters, text-based feedback was also applied to 
describe users’ passwords e.g. “weak”. Other research, such as the work conducted by 
Dehn and Van Mulken [31] concluded that textual information provided more direct 
feedback to end-users. 
The Spengler-Zuul extension developed required a word list in order for affective 
sentences to be constructed, with an indication as to the whether they were positively 
or negatively weighted. 
The AFINN database developed by Finn ̊Arup Nielsen at DTU Informatics, Tech-
nical University of Denmark [35] was chosen for this purpose. A 2011 paper describes 
the construction of the wordlist, scoring of the words, and the overall impact. Specifi-
cally, it was the AFINN-111.txt wordlist which was used during the experimental 
design process.  The wordlist was specifically developed for microblogs e.g. services 
such as Twitter where users post short messages. This concept fits in with this re-
search project as the affective feedback solution aims to regularly updates end-users 
with short messages depending upon their actions. 
Text-based feedback has been split into 3 sections, or bars: password information, 
general information, and malicious site information. 
The final pieces of affective text integrated into the Spengler-Zuul extension had to 
be designed in such a way that when weighted words were placed into the phrases, the 
phrases themselves still made sense. In addition to this, positive and negative versions 
of phrases were required for triggers e.g. if a user visited a safe site or a malicious 
site. 
In the case of unencrypted sites (HTTP) and social media sites, users were provided 
only with a general warning.  It is possible to visit a social media site and stay safe, 
provided you are mindful regarding the information you are sharing with others. Simi-
larly, you can visit an unencrypted website and behave in a completely safe way e.g. 
not entering sensitive information. 
When writing affective phrases, care was taken to provide balanced text. As an ex-
ample, the malicious links message telling users they are safe has a positive rating of 
2. Conversely, the negative message for the opposing trigger has a rating of -2, mean-
ing the warnings carry the same severity. In some cases, multiple weighted words 
were added to affective phrases to provide the same level of weighting. Within the 
positive malicious links message, the weighted words “validated” and “safe” have 
been included. These each carry a weighting of 1, giving an overall score of 2. In 
terms of the opposing, negative message, the only weighted word which has been 
used is “harmful”, which has a negative weighing of -2. 
The final affective phrases for the malicious links are as follows- 
•  Positive text: “Links found on the page have been validated and deemed safe.” 
• Negative text: “Harmful links have been found on the page.” 
 
Colour-based feedback 
Another method of providing affective feedback to the end-user involves the use of 
certain colours in a bid to influence users. To provide an example, in Western culture, 
the colour red has long been associated with danger. Research carried out by Kralik, 
J.D. et. al. [36] has even proposed that the link between the colour red and dangerous 
situations may be rooted in evolutionary psychology. 
In terms of cyber security, a number of studies have been conducted, into the use of 
colour-based feedback including Ur’s 2012 paper [29] on password meters. 
 Colour-based feedback, in combination with sound, was also one method of 
affective feedback successfully implemented in a game called "Brainchild" developed 
by McDarby et al. [26] which attempts to help users relax. 
During the development of the extension, the following colours were chosen for 
inclusion to denote affect: a shade of red (#CF4250), yellow (#EBA560), and green 





Avatar-based feedback may be an appropriate form of affective feedback when 
attempting to educate users. Again the Brainchild tool by McDarby et. al. [26] 
indicated affective feedback can help users alter their internal states. Avatars have 
been used to good effect in intelligent tutoring systems [27], with Hall et. al. [28] 
agreeing that the use of avatars may prove effective in influencing the emotional state 
of the end-user, thus forming part of this research. 
To allow for delivery of avatar-based affective feedback within the browser-based 
environment, 2 avatars displaying subtle facial cues were selected from the paper by 
Sacharin et. al. [37]. The paper makes reference to the previously identified 6 basic 
emotions [38]: happiness, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and surprise, and also includes 
a neutral avatar, devoid of any such emotion. The 2 avatars selected for inclusion in 
this research project were happiness and sadness, to denote positive and negative 
feedback accordingly. 
Research has shown that people are uncertain about emotions displayed in 
expression sequences in comparison to simple static images [37]. Due to this finding, 




Within the affective feedback solution, there is also a system of flags in place, which 
is designed to provide an overall level of feedback, depending on users’ actions. 
One example of this would involve the password feedback. There are multiple 
areas of password feedback which can be shown to the user involving length and 
commonality. A password may be short (bad) however, it may be a non-dictionary 
word (good). To prevent the system from providing users with positive feedback 
when they have failed any of the password security checks, the password flags are 
checked and provide an override. So whilst users may have an uncommon, yet short 
password, they are still shown negative affective text, colours and avatars. They will 
only be shown positive feedback when they meet all levels of the password security 
criteria. Each bar has its own set of flags which determine the overall colours of the 
password, general info and malicious links bar. 
 
 
Spengler-Zuul extension developed 
A number of versions of the final tool, named the Spengler-Zuul extension were 
developed, allowing the impact of different combinations of affective feedback to be 
tested against a control environment.  5 versions of the tool were created: 
• Spengler-Zuul (none)- monitors users but showed no on-screen feedback. 
• Spengler-Zuul (text)- monitors users and displays text-based affective feedback. 
• Spengler-Zuul (text and avatar)- monitors users and displays text-based affective 
feedback, alongside an avatar situated in the bottom right of the screen. 
• Spengler-Zuul (text and colour)- monitors users and displays text-based affective 
feedback, with a colour coded traffic light system background. 
• Spengler-Zuul (text and colour and avatar)- monitors users and displays text- based 
affective feedback, with a colour coded traffic light system background. Addition-
ally, an avatar is situated in the bottom right of the screen (see Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Affective feedback displayed in the browser via the Spengler-Zuul extension 
3.4 Experiments 
Participants were initially given a briefing handout, outlining the experimental pro-
cess. Participants were drawn from Abertay University, and many had a computing 
background.  No reference was made to the type of feedback which would be provid-
ed. The fact that risky security behaviours and awareness were also being measured 
was omitted from the information for participants, in order to avoid bias. 
Participants were then given a USB stick labelled with a number from 1-5.  Each 
USB stick contained a portable version of the Firefox browser, and a version of the 
Spengler-Zuul extension.  The types of feedback delivered corresponded to the num-
bers 1-5, and are outlined in Table. 1.  Participants were asked to visit a number of 
pre-defined websites, following on-screen instructions.  Some of the websites were 
chosen to purposely trigger feedback e.g. a HTTP warning.  On completion of the 
computer-based part of the experiment, participants were asked to complete a paper-
based questionnaire utilising Likert Scales.  This allowed participants to assess their 
response to the on-screen feedback received.  Participants were only allowed to take 
part in the experiments once only, regardless of the experiment group they were in. 
  
 
Table. 1.  Experiment groups and feedback types 
Group Feedback type Participants 
(n) 
1 Control 12 
2 Text 13 
3 Text, avatar 16 
4 Text, colour 14 
5 Text, colour, avatar 17 
 
4 Results 
A control group was used during the experimental phase, and received no on-screen 
feedback, however they were asked to visit the same websites.  Questions in the study 
were conditional to allow for the control group to be compared against those who 
received some form of affective feedback.  The questions sought to assess the poten-
tial impact of affective feedback on awareness of risky security behaviours.  By ana-
lysing responses to the Likert Scale questionnaire, a p-value was gained via the use of 
the Mann-Whitney U test to indicate statistical significance (Table. 2). 
 
Table. 2.  Control group vs. affective feedback results 
 
Statistical significance- question vs. experiment 
Question Group 1 
vs. 2 
Group  
1 vs. 3 
Group  
1 vs. 4 
Group 1 
vs. 5 
If you received negative password-related feedback, did it 
make you consider changing your Facebook password? 
No No No No 
If you received social media-related feedback, did it make 
you consider the information you share online? 
No No No No 
If you received feedback about malicious links on a page, 
did it make you consider which links you were clicking on? 
No Yes No No 
Did the feedback make you hesitate to provide information 
online? 
No Yes No Yes 
Did the feedback clearly highlight any issues with the page? No No No No 
Do you think the feedback provided helped to increase your 
security awareness? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Did you find the feedback useful? Yes No Yes Yes 
Did the feedback encourage you to learn more about online 
security? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
In comparing data from the control experiment when participants were asked “Do you 
think the feedback provided helped to increase your security awareness?”, all affec-
tive experiments produced a positive, statistically significant result. This indicates 
participants feel the affective feedback has had an impact on security awareness. 
Similarly, when asked “Did the feedback encourage you to learn more about online 
security?”, again, all affective experiments produced a statistically significant result 
in comparison to the control responses. This indicates that in the opinion of the partic-
ipants, the affective feedback has had some form of impact on them, encouraging 
them to improve their behavior in the future. 
In terms of finding the feedback useful, the only group which failed to produce a 
statistically significant result in this instance was experiment 3 (text and avatar-based 
feedback) in comparison to the control group. Other results were mixed, with text and 
avatar-based feedback proving successful in eliciting a hesitant response in partici-
pants when they were clicking on links, and when they were asked to provide infor-
mation online. 
5 Discussion 
Participants were asked to answer 8 questions during the study relating to on-screen 
feedback, in an effort to determine the potential impact of affective feedback on 
security awareness.  The results of the two questions “Do you think the feedback 
provided helped to increase your security awareness?” and “Did the feedback 
encourage you to learn more about online security?” produced positive, statistically 
significant results for all affective experiments. This indicates that no form of 
affective feedback delivered out-performed the other.  In this study any form of 
affective feedback (text, colour, avatars) had an impact on overall awareness. 
When comparing the questionnaire results regarding the impact of the affective 
feedback, there were statistically significant differences when experiment 1 (control) 
participants were compared to those who engaged with the affective feedback-based 
experiments. 
When participants were asked “Do you think the feedback provided helped to 
increase your security awareness?”, all affective experiment questionnaire results 
produced a positive, statistically significant result when compared to the control 
group questionnaire data. This indicates that in this study, the affective feedback was 
successful in creating a positive impact on the security awareness of the end-user. 
A similar statistically significant result was generated when participants were asked 
“Did the feedback encourage you to learn more about online security?”. All affective 
experiment questionnaire results produced a positive, statistically significant result 
when compared to the control group questionnaires. This result highlights again that 
the affective feedback appears to have influenced the participants into thinking about 
their security behaviours online, with the possibility of prompting them to engage in 
better security choices in future web-browsing. The result also links to the need for 
education: in this instance it appears the participants were eager to learn. 
Again, results of the two questions “Do you think the feedback provided helped to 
increase your security awareness?” and “Did the feedback encourage you to learn 
more about online security?” were interesting as no form affective feedback delivered 
surpassed the other in terms of the impact on the end-user.  This is an interesting 
result as a separate part of the questionnaire asked participants which type of affective 
feedback they felt had the largest impact.  Raw results gained from this question 
indicated participants felt colour had the largest impact, though it was only used in 2 
of the experiment groups. 
When asked if the feedback provided was useful, only one comparison group failed 
to produce a statistically significant result. The group in question was experiment 3 
(text and avatar-based feedback). This result correlates with the raw results in another 
part of the questionnaire, where participants indicated that colour had the largest 
impact during the experimental process, though it should be noted that experiment 2 
(text-based feedback) produced a statistically significant result, despite the lack of 
colour-based feedback. 
The other results gained from the experiments were mixed. When asked if the 
feedback made them hesitate to provide information online, both experiment 3 (text 
and avatar-based feedback) and experiment 5 (text, colour and avatar-based feedback) 
were successful, again highlighting a potential impact on end-user security behaviour. 
Experiment 3 also appeared to have an impact on the way they browsed online, 
making them consider the links they were clicking on, guiding them to avoid 
engagement in risky security behaviours. 
In terms of the affective feedback delivered, some participants left free-form 
comments on the questionnaire, stating some participants thought the affective 
solution is a useful application, with comments such as “I find the extension useful for 
people who do not know much about online security”, “Very helpful, especially for 
strong passwords”, and “I think this is a good idea to raise awareness on online 
security especially people that are new to technology”. 
As of August 2015, Mozilla announced XUL-based extensions would be deprecat-
ed, and they would move to a new API named WebExtensions [39]. In addition to 
this, at the start of 2017, Mozilla started to integrate warnings (text-based) in Firefox 
regarding password entry on a non-HTTPS website [40].  This is a feature which was 
integrated into the Spengler-Zuul extension in 2015, and highlights the importance of 
security awareness in the context of a browser-based environment. 
6 Conclusion/Future work 
To conclude, this research study found that the delivery of affective feedback within 
the confines of a browser-based environment enhanced users’ general awareness of 
security risks online, though it didn’t have an impact on specific behaviours such as 
the information they shared on social media websites.  When compared to the control 
group, statistically significant results were recorded by those who received some form 
of affective feedback. Those who received affective feedback felt it helped to increase 
their security awareness, and that the feedback encouraged them to learn more about 
online security, a factor which could potentially improve their security awareness in 
the future, and modify their behaviour. Overall this suggests that affective feedback 
allows users to consider whether their online behaviours could be perceived as risky. 
This piece of research was a preliminary study to investigate if it was plausible to 
apply affective feedback in the context of a browser-based environment.  If affective 
feedback was delivered over a longer period of time, on a regular basis, this has the 
potential to reflect positive behavioural changes as end-users become more knowl-
edgeable regarding the subject matter.  Future work seeks to investigate the impact of 
a long-term study in this area, utilising varying affective agents e.g. differing word-
lists and avatars.   
Further research could be explored, in a way to modify the delivery and application 
of the affective feedback to make it appeal to specific groups. The Office of National 
Statistics in the UK has noted the rise of Internet users who are aged 75 and over [41]. 
Regardless of the users’ age, they still need to be educated about the dangers of risky 
security behaviour. Modifying the extension to deliver more appropriate feedback e.g. 
have less of a focus on colour as the lens of older people become yellow, distorting 
colours [42] could provide another avenue for investigation.  Similarly, the affective 
feedback delivered could be modified to appeal to children, helping to educate them 




1. Li, Y and Siponen M, A call for research on home users information security behaviour, 
2011, PACIS 2011, Proceedings, paper 112  
2. Stanton, J.M., et al.: Analysis of end user security behaviors. Elsevier. Computers and Se- 
curity 24, pp.124–133 (2005) 
3. Payne, B., Edwards, W.: A brief introduction to usable security. Internet Computing, IEEE 
(Volume:12 , Issue: 3 ) pp. 13–21 (May/June 2008) 
4. Fetscherin, M.: Importance of cultural and risk aspects in music piracy: A cross-national 
comparison among university students. Journal of Electronic Commerce Research (Janu- 
ary 2009), http://www.csulb.edu/journals/jecr/issues/20091/Paper4.pdf 
5. Hadnagy, C.: Social engineering: the art of human hacking, pp. 23–24. Wiley Publishing, 
Indianapolis (2011) 
6. Padayachee, K.: Taxonomy of compliant information security behavior. Computers & Se-
curity 31(5), 673–680 (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2012.04.004 
7. Shay, R., et al. (2016). Designing Password Policies for Strength and Usability. [online]. 
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 18 (4),. 
http://doi.org/10.1145/2891411 
8. Balduzzi,M.:Attackingtheprivacyofsocialnetworkusers.HITBSecconf2011Malaysia (2011), 
http://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/materials/ 
D1T1%20%20Marco%20Balduzzi%20-%20Attacking%20the%20Privacy% 
20of%20Social%20Network%20Users.pdf (accessed September 21, 2012) 
9. Milne, G. R., Labrecque, L. I. and & Cromer, C. (2009). Toward an understanding of the 
online consumer’s risky behavior and protection practices. [online]. Journal of Consumer 
Affairs, 43 (3), pp.449–473. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6606.2009.01148.x 
10. Larose, R., and Rifon, N. J. (2007). Promoting i-safety: Effects of privacy warnings and 
privacy seals on risk assessment and online privacy behavior. [online]. Journal of Con-
sumer Affairs, 41 (1), pp.127-149. 10.1111/j.1745-6606.2006.00071.x 
11. Milne, G. R., Rohm, A. J. and Bahl, S. (2004). Consumers’ Protection of Online Privacy 
and Identity. [online]. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 38, pp.217–232. 10.1111/j.1745- 
6606.2004.tb00865.x 
12. Farahmand, F., et al. (2009). Risk perceptions of information security: A measurement 
study. [online]. In: Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computational 
Science and Engineering, CSE 2009, 3, pp.462–469. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CSE.2009.449 
13. Fischoff, B., et al. (1978). How safe is safe enough? A psychometric study of attitudes to-
wards technological risks and benefits. [online]. Policy Sciences, 9 (2), pp.127–152.5 
14. Takemura, T. (2011). Empirical analysis of behavior on information security. [online]. In: 
Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on Internet of Things and 4th Interna-
tional Conference on Cyber, Physical and Social Computing, ITHINGSCPSCOM, pp.358–
363. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iThings/CPSCom.2011.8 
15. San-Jose, P. and Rodriguez, S. (2011). Study on information security and e-Trust in Span-
ish households. [online]. In: Proceedings of the First Workshop on Building Analysis Da-
tasets and Gathering Experience Returns for Security, BADGERS 2011, pp.1-6. 
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1978672.1978673 
16. Hill, R. and Donaldson, D. R. (2015). Bridging the Trust Gap : Integrating Models of Be-
havior and Perception. [online]. NSPW '15 Proceedings of the 2015 New Security Para-
digms Workshop , pp.148-155. 10.1145/2841113.284112 
17. Furnell, S. et al. (2006). The challenges of understanding and using security: a survey of 
end- users. [online]. Computers & Security, 25 (1), pp.27-35. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2005.12.004 
18. Dhamija, R. and Tygar, J. (2005). The Battle Against Phishing: Dynamic Security Skins. 
[online]. In: Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2005)., pp.1-12. 
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2005/2005proceedings/p77-dhamija.pdf 
19. Sheng, S. (2007). Anti-Phishing Phil: The Design and Evaluation of a Game That Teaches 
People Not to Fall for Phish. [online]. In: Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security 
(SOUPS 2007)., pp.1-12. http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2007/proceedings/p88_sheng.pdf 
20. Kumaraguru, P. et. al. (2009). School of Phish: A Real-World Evaluation of Anti-Phishing 
Training. [online]. n: Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2009)., pp.1-
12. http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2009/proceedings/a3-kumaraguru.pdf 
21. Canova, G. Volkamer, M. Bergmann, C. Reinheimer, B. 2015 Nophish app evaluation: lab 
and retention study. In: NDSS workshop on usable security 
22. Besmer, A. (2009). Social Applications: Exploring A More Secure Framework. [online]. 
In: Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2009), pp.1- 10. 
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2009/proceedings/a2- besmer.pdf 
23. Maurer, M., De Luca, A. and Kempe, S (2011). Using Data Type Based Security Alert Di-
alogs to Raise Online Security Awareness. [online]. In: Symposium On Usable Privacy 
and Security (SOUPS 2011), pp.1-13. 
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2011/proceedings/a2_Maurer.pdf 
24. Volkamer, M. et. al (2015 ). Design and Field Evaluation of PassSec: Raising and Sustain-
ing Web Surfer Risk Awareness. [online]. Trust and Trustworthy Computing: 8th Interna-
tional Conference, TRUST 2015, pp.104–122. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22846- 
4_7 
25. Picard, R.W. Affective Computing; MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 1997; pp. 15. 
26. McDarby, G.; Condron, J.; Hughes, D.; Augenblick, N. Affective feedback. Media Lab 
Europe (2004). Available online: 
http://medialabeurope.org/mindgames/publications/publication AffectiveFeedbackEna-
blingTechnologies.pdf (accessed on 22 May 2012). 
27. Robison, J.; McQuiggan, S.; Lester, J. Evaluating the Consequences of Affective Feedback 
in Intelligent Tutoring Systems. In Proceedings of International Conference on Affective 
Computing and Intelligent Interaction (ACII 2009), Amsterdam, Netherlands, 10–12 Sep-
tember 2009; pp. 37–42.  
28. Hall, L.; Woods, S.; Aylett, R.S.; Newall, L.; Paiva, A.C.R. Achieving Empathic Engage-
ment through Affective Interaction with Synthetic Characters; Tao, J., Tan, T., Picard, 
R.W., Eds.; Springer: Heidelberg, Germany, 2005; Volume 3784, pp. 731–738. 
29. Ur, B., et al. (2012). How does your password measure up? The effect of strength meters 
on password creation. [online]. In: Security 2012 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX Con-
ference on Security Symposium, 
30. Adams, F. M., & Osgood, C. E. (1973). A cross-cultural study of the affective meanings of 
color. Journal of cross-cultural psychology, 4(2), 135-156. 
31. Dehn, D. and Van Mulken, S (2012). The impact of animated interface agents: a review of 
empirical research. [online]. International Journal of Human– Computer Studies, 52 (1), 
pp.1- 22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/ijhc.1999.0325 
32. Bubaš, G., Orehova, T. and & Konecki, M. (2008). Factors and Predictors of Online Secu-
rity and Privacy Behavior. [online]. Journal of Information and Organizational Sciences, 
32 (2), pp.79–98. 
33. HpHosts. 2016. [online]. http://www.hosts-file.net/ 
34. Fenstermacher, K.D. and Ginsburg, M.A. (2002). Lightweight framework for cross- appli-
cation user monitoring. [online]. IEEE Computer, pp.51–58. 
35. Nielsen, F (2011). A new ANEW: evaluation of a word list for sentiment analysis in mi-
croblogs. [online]. Proceedings of the ESWC2011 Workshop on 'Making Sense of Mi-
croposts': Big things come in small packages. Volume 718 in CEUR Workshop Proceed-
ings, pp.93-98. 
36. Association For Psychological Science (2011). Stop On Red! The Effects of Color May 
Lie Deep in Evolution.... [online]. 
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/news/releases/stop-on-red-a-monkey-
study- suggests-that-the-effects-of-color-lie-deep-in-evolution.html 
37. Sacharin, V., Sander, D. and Scherer, K. R. (2012). The perception of changing emotion 
expressions. [online]. Cognition & Emotion, pp.1273–1300. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2012.656583 
38. Ekman, P. (1999). Basic emotions. [online]. Cognition,. 
http://doi.org/10.1002/0470013494.ch3 
39. Mozilla (2015). The Future of Developing Firefox Add-ons. [online]. 
https://blog.mozilla.org/addons/2015/08/21/the-future-of-developing-firefox-add-ons/ 
40. Mozilla (2017). Designed to protect your privacy. [online]. https://www.mozilla.org/en-
GB/firefox/desktop/trust/ 
41. Office for National Statistics (2016). Internet users in the UK: 2016. [online]. 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/itandinternetindustry/bulletins/internetus
ers/2 016#recent-internet-use-is-on-the-increase-for-those-aged-65-and-over 
42. Salvi, S. M., Akhtar, S., and Currie, Z. (2006). Ageing changes in the eye. [online]. Post-
graduate Medical Journal, 971, pp.581–587. http://doi.org/10.1136/pgmj.2005.040857 
